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Abstract
I document how corporate investment reacts to immigration. I use an interac-
tion of ex ante clusters of immigrants and a change in immigration policy in the
United Kingdom to provide evidence that the amount of investment increases in
anticipation of immigration flows. The variation introduced by the immigration
policy allows me to control for local economic shocks. Part of the increase in in-
vestment occurs through a transitory increase in fixed assets. The major change
occurs in the extensive margin, through an increase in firm creation. The increase
is larger for the knowledge and the service sectors, suggesting that human capital
is an important driver of the effect. The results indicate that firms might quickly
react to an immigration-induced labor supply shock.
1 Introduction
For many net-receiving countries, immigration has become one of the main sources
of new labor over the past decades. According to the International Labor Organisation
(ILO) (2015), international immigration to industrialized countries increased at a yearly
rate of 30% from 2010 to 2013. Concerns about the economic effects of immigration
on the native population make immigration a contentious political topic. According to
reports by the House of Commons, in 2007, British voters reported immigration as their
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biggest policy concern (Lang, 2008). Polls also suggest that the Brexit vote in the United
Kingdom is connected to voter's attitudes toward immigration. An Ipsos poll documents
that one week before the 2016 referendum on Britains membership in the European
Union, more than half of voters supporting Leave considered immigration a key issue.1
The main economic arguments against immigration focus on its potential negative
short-term wage effects. The logic sounds simple: immigration increases labor supply
and, therefore, decreases labor costs. Finding these negative wage effects in the data,
however, is difficult. According to Peri (2014), in 27 empirical studies, estimates of
elasticities of wages to increases in the share of immigrant workers range from -0.8 to
+0.8, with most studies reporting a zero effect.
My paper contributes to the debate by examining how corporate investment adjusts to
labor supply increases caused by immigration. If investment adjusts contemporaneously
to labor, average wages might not decrease. To empirically measure the relationship be-
tween immigration and investment, I explore a unique natural experiment that increased
immigration to the United Kingdom: a change in policy that gave full working rights
to nationals from countries admitted to the EU in 2004. I use a difference-in-differences
strategy. Thereby, I combine the policy change with cross-sectional variation from ex ante
clusters of immigrants to provide reduced-form estimates of the effects of immigration on
investment and firm creation.
The results show different responses of investment to immigration in the intensive
and the extensive margins. First, for the intensive margin, firms located in districts with
higher ex ante immigration exposure show a significant increase in fixed asset investments
after the EU expansion announcement. A one-standard-deviation increase in ex ante
immigration exposure is associated with a 1.9% within-firm increase in long-term fixed
assets. The increase in fixed asset investment is not significant when combining the
effect of the policy announcement and the implementation. Fixed assets do not increase
more after the implementation of the policy. Furthermore, total within-firm assets do
not significantly change either after announcement or after implementation of the policy.
These results suggest a simple, yet powerful, explanation for why labor costs do not drop
on average even if immigration increase labor supply: long-term adjustments to capital
investment may occur in anticipation of the labor supply increase.
Second, for the extensive margin, the results show a significant increase in the incorpo-
ration of new firms after the open policy announcement and a further significant increase
after the implementation. A one-standard-deviation increase in ex ante immigration ex-
posure leads to a 1.78% increase in the number of firms incorporated. The data show an
additional increase of 3% in the number of incorporated firms after the policy implemen-
tation. The increase is significant when combining the effect of the policy announcement
1See https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/immigration-now-top-issue-voters-eu-referendum.
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and implementation. Using the interaction between the policy announcement and the ex
ante immigration clusters as an instrument, a 0.5% immigration-induced labor supply
increasethe average UK labor force growthtranslates into a 17.5% increase in the
number of total incorporated firms.
Next, I examine whether there are heterogeneous effects across the different sectors.
Whether firm adjustments occur through the expansion of existing firms or through the
incorporation of new firms depends on the sector. For construction, there is a persistent
increase in both fixed assets and total assets. The IV estimation reports that a 0.5%
immigration-induced labor supply shock translates into a 5% within-firm increase in fixed
capital investment for all firms in the construction sector.
For firm creation, the effects are larger in sectors that rely on human capital or that
provide services. Following Jeffers (2017), I define knowledge-intensive sectors based on
the type of occupations employed in the industry. I define knowledge firms as those with
a main classification in computer programming, information technologies, architecture,
business consulting, engineering technical consulting, research, design, health, or educa-
tion.2 New firm incorporation significantly increases both in the knowledge and in the
service sector in districts with higher immigration. These increases are associated with
a fundamental shift in the economic environment. The average firm in these sectors be-
comes smaller. Existing firms in the service sector significantly decrease their total assets.
For the knowledge sector, there is also a decrease in existing firms assets, but it is not
significant.
Regarding changes in wages, this paper shows that wages do not significantly change
at the district level. The same results hold for the average remuneration within firms and
when separating firms by sectors of the economy. Moreover, the signs of the estimates
are not consistent. In construction, where adjustments occur through increases in fixed
capital, the sign of the estimated wage elasticity is positive. In the knowledge and the
service sectors, where adjustments occur through an increase in the number of firms, the
signs are negative. However, in all of these sectors, the wage effects are insignificant for
the average worker in pre-existing firms.
The results in this paper offer a potential explanation for why prior studies have failed
to find large effects for immigration-induced labor supply increases on wages. In a model
with constant returns to scale, a labor supply increase generates negative short-term wage
effects if firms do not invest enough. The lack of investment causes the marginal value
of labor to decrease in the short-term. As my results suggest, if investment adjusts in
anticipation of labor flow increases, the transfer from workers to capital need not occur.
Investment decisions can also depend on immigration itself. Immigrants could set up
new firms or bring human capital necessary for the expansion of certain industries. This
2The exact industries are reported in the Appendix.
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paper also provides evidence of this mechanism.
Immigration has potential benefits: it can change the talent pool and offer incentives
to create new firms. A varied workforce can also improve the development of certain
sectors and reduce incentives for outsourcing (Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright (2013). If
capital flows to areas in which it is scarce in relation to incoming labor, the economy
enjoys the benefits of immigration without paying the short-term economic costs in terms
of lower wages.3 Moreover, not all immigration is equal. If immigration generates positive
changes in the skill composition of workers, then complementarities with capital can
smooth out the wage effects (Lewis, 2013; Friedberg and Hunt, 1995).
Studying the relationship between immigration and investment is challenging because
the potential endogeneity concerns are many. Immigrants may settle in places where
growth is already expected.
This paper addresses these concerns using the following strategy. First, I rely on a
pre-determined cross-sectional measure related only to the immigrant group treated by
the policy. This strategy relies on the observation that immigrants relocate to places
where their peers are, rather than to places where the economy grows regardless of im-
migration. Nonetheless, the existing immigration clusters could already predict future
growth patterns. Area-time dummies restrict the effects to the local level. For endogene-
ity to arise, the immigrant group needs to predict economic growth at a local level that is
smaller than a city. Because of the policy change, the empirical strategy can control for
unobservable time-invariant differences at the district level when studying firm creation.
Third, I rely on micro data at the firm-level to determine the intensive margin effects. I
use firm-level fixed effects to control for the firms time-invariant characteristics. The pa-
per presents evidence that parallel trend assumptions are likely to hold for the variables
of interest in the period before the policy. Assuming the trends would have remained
parallel in the absence of the policy change, the reduced-form estimates have a causal
interpretation.
The paper also explores mechanisms that explain the main results in firm-level in-
vestment and in firm creation. Categorizing firms by their board composition in 2001, I
examine whether firm-level investment and employment decisions are related to the cul-
tural proximity between firm directors and the immigrants in a specific location.4 There
is no evidence that firms with Eastern European majority boards increase their fixed
assets or employ more workers than their counterparts in the same district.
On the other hand, both UK and Eastern European nationals create more firms after
the immigration shock. This suggests that new British entrepreneurs also benefit from
3Some groups may still be harmed if new immigrants compete with workers from certain levels of skill,
as discussed by Borjas (1999) and Borjas (2003). Also, Card (2009) discusses the effects of immigration
on inequality.
4This is the channel explored by Burchardi and Hassan (2013).
4
increased immigration. Furthermore, the rate of firms created by Eastern European
directors as a proportion of the total increases significantly. These results suggest that
firm creation is driven by immigrants and not by previously existing social or cultural
ties.
Another potential mechanism behind the increase in investment is the change in the
skill mix that immigration brings. If immigration is predominantly low-skill, immigration
might substitute capital because immigrants take jobs in danger of automation (Lewis,
2011). If immigration is predominantly high-skill then it complements capital (Friedberg
and Hunt, 1995). Manacorda, Manning, and Wadsworth (2012) provide evidence that,
over the past two decades, high-skill workers tend to immigrate to the United Kingdom.
I complement that evidence in three ways.
First, the data show a significant increase in firm creation in the knowledge sector,
evidence that is in line with the findings of Ashraf and Ray (2017) for the United States.
Local-level immigration exposure is associated with a significant increase in the number of
firms incorporated in the knowledge sector, which, by definition, relies on specialized la-
bor. Second, I show that, after the immigration policy shock, the educational attainment
of Eastern European immigrants, compared to that of natives, significantly improves.
Third, the data show that the remuneration to the highest-paid director within firm sig-
nificantly drops in the service sector. There are also negative effects for directors in the
knowledge sector, but they are not significant. For average workers, the effect is never
significant and the magnitude is smaller. Hence, the negative effects on compensation
concentrate in the higher part of the income distribution within the firm. The negative
wage effects for the best paid support the hypothesis that, in this setting, immigration
increases competition in the top part of the skill distribution.
This paper contributes to three strands of literature. First, I study the interaction
between labor markets and firm-level decisions. Like in Dustmann and Glitz (2011) and
Ashraf and Ray (2017), I document results opposite to the economic literature that shows
substitution among immigrants and capital investment (Lewis, 2011). My results show
that, in the short run, immigrant labor can complement capital investment in industries
like construction. Furthermore, immigration can also generate adjustments in the creation
of new firms in sectors that rely on human capital. Two key elements are necessary for
this result to occur: first, the change in the skill composition of immigrants and, second,
UK policies. More specifically, Eastern European immigration to the United Kingdom,
in terms of educational attainment, tends to be of higher skill after the immigration
policy change, and the open border policy in the United Kingdom did not cap legal
immigration from Eastern Europe, but allowed a delay between the announcement and
the implementation.
I contribute, empirically, to the extensive finance and macroeconomic literature on
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capital adjustments. Capital investments take time. There are costs of maintaining cap-
ital to react to new investment opportunities (Mitchell, Pedersen, and Pulvino, 2007;
Duffie, 2010). Moreover, fixed capital investments require both adjustment costs and
that assets are not easily traded in secondary markets (Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006).
However, in the setting used in this paper, I show that fixed capital investments react
in anticipation of labor flows in construction. In other sectors, such as the knowledge
sector, which relies on human capital, or the service sector, which relies on labor-intensive
tasks, adjustments arise through new entrepreneurial activity. My paper suggests immi-
gration can also reduce barriers to entry when human capital is scarce. Entrepreneurship
increases, although the average firm is smaller.
I also contribute to the extensive literature on the effects of immigration on labor
markets (see Card, 1990; Borjas, 2001; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; Peri, 2012; Ottaviano,
Peri, and Wright, 2013). I provide additional evidence that average wages do not de-
crease when immigration increases. Finally, I document another positive link between
immigration and entrepreneurship.5 My interpretation of the results provided in this
paper suggests a more nuanced view of the costs and the benefits of immigration.
2 The immigration policy change
My analysis focuses on a major change in immigration policy in the United Kingdom
triggered by the expansion of the European Union in 2004, a time during which the
United Kingdom was a member.
After a long period of discussions, in April 2003, the EU announced the Treaty of
Accession, with the objective of incorporating new members. The treaty implementa-
tion date was May 2004. The implementation of the treaty allowed immigration policy
discretion for a limited period of time. Old EU members could delay working rights
for nationals from new admitted countries for a maximum of 7 years. Only 3 older
membersthe United Kingdom, Sweden, and Irelandallow nationals from incoming
country members to work freely from May 2004.
For the case of the United Kingdom, foreign nationals from the newly admitted coun-
tries had the right to work conditional on registration to National Insurance. This reg-
istration did not provide welfare benefits. Furthermore, registration was not automatic.
However, it was in the best interest of immigrants to register since it was a legal require-
ment.
The paper focuses on immigration from 8 newly admitted Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia
5See Hunt (2011), Decker et al. (2014), and Fairlie and Lofstrom (2013).
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and Hungary.6 Figure 1 offers a summary of the immigration decisions across older EU
members.
Following the policy change, the United Kingdom experienced a large inflow of people
from Central and Eastern Europe. The amount of immigration was underestimated by
the British government at the time of the policy implementation, partly because the gov-
ernment was expecting more EU countries to also grant full labor rights. A report by the
Home Office (Casanova et al., 2003) estimated an influx of 13,000 long-term immigrants
per year. According to figures from the Organisation of National Statistics (ONS), the
number was closer to 50,000 per year. After the 2004 expansion and the subsequent open
border policy, British attitudes toward immigration changed significantly. According to
an immigration report by the House of Commons (Lang, 2008), polls documented that in
the 1990s only 5% of the British population considered immigration the most important
issue in Britain. By 2007, the number increased to 40%. For the next EU expansion, the
British government changed its policy. When the opportunity resurfaced in 2007 with
new members, the British government decided not to open labor markets. In other words,
for the subsequent expansion the United Kingdom adopted a restrictive policy similar to
the ones adopted by other European countries in 2004. This policy is consistent with the
idea that the British government decided to control immigration after the open border
policy of 2004.
According to ONS data, National Insurance registrations increased after 2004, point-
ing to an important immigration-induced labor supply shock. As I show in Figures 2 and
3, the increase is driven by incoming nationals from Central and Eastern European coun-
tries. After the implementation of the open border policy, nationals from these countries
of origin (commonly referred to as the EU8 group) became the most representative group
in terms of registrations. They represented 3.1% of the registrations by 2002 and 38.4%
by 2005. However, it does not seem that the increase came at the expense of a reduction
in the number of new workers from other groups. Figure 2 shows that registrations remain
constant for nationals from European countries with pre-existing labor rights (EU15) af-
ter the policy. Figure 3 reveals that nationals from other European countries not yet
admitted to the EU, but that would be admitted in 2007, registered at the same rate.7
Therefore, the policy expanded the number of workers and should not be interpreted as
a mere recomposition of the immigrants that were admitted as workers in the United
Kingdom.
6Malta and Cyprus were also admitted, but their effect was small and, for historical reasons, they
already had some rights in the United Kingdom. Moreover, their population inside the United Kingdom
was not large enough to be reported at the local level in the Census.
7The same patterns emerge if I use registrations of workers from the rest of Europe.
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3 Data
3.1 Employment and National Insurance data
To measure immigration at the district level, I use both employment data from the
Department of Work and Pensions and census data from the Organisation of National
Statistics (ONS). After the EU expansion of 2004, nationals from the newly admitted
countries needed to register a National Insurance number to obtain the right to work
in the United Kingdom. Figure 1 represents the number of national insurance numbers
registered by year. I divide the registrations into two groups: nationals from new countries
and nationals from countries that were already part of the EU. The figure shows that,
after the policy change, registrations from the new group surpassed those from the original
EU members.
National Insurance number (NINO) registrations are not a measure of long-term im-
migration, and they do not account for immigrates who return to their native country.
Registrations only account for the district in which immigrants register their intention to
work in the United Kingdom. For registration, any immigrant needs a UK address. This
address determines the district of registration.
Despite its problems, not accounting immigrates that return and accounting for reg-
istration near the first address of the registrant, the number of NINO registrations is the
best possible measure in this paper for several reasons. First, long-term immigration is
normally measured at the local level in the census, but my analysis requires a higher
frequency. To determine the effects of new immigration on investment, I need at least
yearly data. Therefore, I use NINO registrations as a proxy.
I aggregate labor data at the district level. Because of the availability of data, my
analysis is restricted to England. I use the 326 English districts to construct the summary
statistics. The average population of a district, as of 2002, is approximately 92,000 people
with a standard deviation of 63,042 people. In terms of population, English districts are
comparable to counties in the United States.
In Table 1, I provide the summary statistics for the National Insurance number
(NINO) registrations and employment data both after and before the 2004 EU expansion.
The total number of NINOs by any country of origin doubled after the EU expansion,
going from 842.9 to 1,556.3 registrations. Most of the increase is related to the inflow
of nationals from countries admitted in 2004 (the EU8 group). Before the change, an
average of 34.3 EU8 workers registered in a specific district, but after the policy change,
registrations increased to 572.1 per district. This number made the EU8 group the largest
source of registrations, surpassing the previous dominant group: the old EU members who
had free labor mobility since the 1990s. Between 2004 and 2007, one-third of all NINO
registrations to foreigners in England were issued to nationals of countries admitted to
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the EU in 2004.
In the census, the data are reported at the local level, which is, in some cases, smaller
than the district level. When a local authority does not form a unique district, I aggregate
the data at the district level. Mapping between local authorities and districts is not one-
to-one, because sometimes a local authority belongs to multiple districts. If this is the
case, I assign each local authority to a single district based on how much of the territory
belongs to the local authority.
I use 2001 census data to construct the pre-existing immigration cluster measures.
The measure is constructed using the percentage of workers from Central and Eastern
European origins. The 2001 census does not provide the EU8 subdivision. I use a proxy
that accounts for the number of people from EU8 plus Romania and Bulgaria. An average
of 2.3% (SD = 2.1%) of workers have this origin as of 2001.
3.2 Firm directors' data
The data are retrieved from Bureau van Dijk's ORBIS and FAME firm databases.
The data on directors (board members) cover the entire universe of firms in the United
Kingdom.
Tables 2 and 3 provide firm-level summary statistics for the characteristics of the
board of directors. Table 2 provides information about the board characteristics for all
firms in the United Kingdom that were incorporated by 2000. Firms established before
the policy have boards with a similar nationality composition over time.8 Around 91% of
directors are British. This proportion slowly increases over time. Likewise, the proportion
of EU directors remains relatively flat over time. Around 4.5% of directors are nationals
from old EU members. Only 0.08% are nationals from countries that were admitted by
the EU in 2004 (EU8).
On the other hand, there seems to be a structural change on the board composition
for younger firms. Table 3 provides information for the composition of newly created
firms by the firms year of incorporation. Firms created after 2000 are more diverse in
terms of the nationalities of the directors. The proportion of directors from countries
admitted before 2004 (EU15) increased from 4.6% in 2000 to a maximum of 9.6% in
2006. Similarly, the percentage of board members from EU countries admitted in 2004
(EU8) increased from 0.08% to almost 1% by 2008.
8This does not mean that director turnover is zero. These results could be driven by two reasons: (1)
the persistence of directors or (2) the replacement of directors with other directors who have a similar
origin.
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3.3 Firm financial data
I collect the financial data from BvD's FAME database.9 To study firm-level employ-
ment, I restrict the sample to firms that report at least one employee between 2001 and
2005. Table 4 reports the summary statistics.
The average total remuneration by firms to workers remains constant over time .
The average number of employees increases from 243 to 310 over the sample. Moreover,
the average salary per employee decreases over the sample. On the other hand, both
total director remuneration and the remuneration for the highest-paid director increases
over this period. The pay gap between workers and directors widens. The increase in
directors' compensation is consistent with the stylized facts in the executive compensation
literature (Edmans, Gabaix, and Jenter, 2017). More importantly, it is also consistent
with patterns among public firms in the FTSE 100 (CIPD Executive Pay Report, 2017).
Financial reporting is not required for all firms, and, even when required, not all firms
file the same variables. Normally, firms limit themselves to providing information about
their assets.
For some of the analysis, I aggregate the data at the district level. In most instances,
ORBIS directly reports the firms district. However, for special cases, like London, the
data report the whole city and not specific districts. In these cases, I identify the firms
postal code and then aggregate postal codes at the district level. Once I assign each firm
location to a district, I match this information with immigration and census data.
4 Empirical setting
There are many identification challenges to disentangle in determining the causal
effects of immigration on investment and firm creation. First, the decision to settle in
a specific location is potentially driven by other factors that increase labor demand.
Furthermore, demand factors are persistent. Hence, immigrants could be settling in
districts that would have higher investment regardless of immigration. If this is the case,
a standard ordinary least square (OLS) regression of immigration on investment would
lead to biased results.
An event study on the effects of the open border policy does not completely address
these problems. The EU8 admission to the European Union in May 2004 is an endogenous
decision, and the admission itself was planned. Furthermore, the expansion required the
agreement of all EU members. EU negotiations considered the economic conditions at the
time. Moreover, the adoption of an open border policy in the United Kingdom after the
European Union expansion is also endogenous. This decision reveals information about
9This database was constructed on a joint effort by Juanita Gonzalez-Uribe, Daniel Paravisini, Su
Wang, the Abraaj Group at FMG, the LSE library team and Bureau Van Dijk.
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the state of the economy, even in the counterfactual case of no change in immigration
policy. If the British economy was expected to grow significantly and demand more labor,
regardless of the EU8 admission, the difference before and after the policy overestimates
the effect of immigration.
To provide more convincing evidence, I use a difference-in-differences strategy. The
source of cross-sectional variation is the proportion of Eastern European workers as of
2001 in a specific district. To add time variation, I interact this measure with the UK im-
migration policy change. To address potential endogeneity problems, I control for district
fixed effects and wider area economic trends when studying district-level outcomes.10 I
control for firm fixed effects, rather that district fixed effects, and economic area trends
when studying firm-level outcomes. This is an improvement over the standard shift-share
instrument that predicts future flows of migrants based on past stock of migrants from
the same origin. By exploiting the policy change, I absorb time-invariant characteristics
of the locations where original Eastern European migrants settled before the policy.
To identify the causal effects of immigration on investment, the ideal research design
consists of an experiment that randomly allocates different levels of immigration across
districts in the United Kingdom and then measures the effects of immigration on invest-
ment. This paper relies on an interaction between a natural experiment (the announced
immigration policy change) and an ex ante measure of immigration clusters. This identi-
fication is similar to the shift share instrument Altonji and Card (1991) and Card (2001)
originally used.
My empirical strategy resembles the ideal experiment in two ways. First, the pre-
existing clusters of immigrants affect the intensity with which each district is treated.
Immigrants are more likely to settle in locations where there is a larger community of
immigrants with the same origin. For this reason, I use EU8 worker clusters, and not
total immigration. Using stocks of immigrants from a specific origin diminishes concerns
that aggregate demand shocks drive immigration. One important identifying assumption
is that the immigration pull factors are related to closeness to peers rather than economic
characteristics of particular locations. However, this strategy cannot control for district-
level differences. If the settlement of immigrants in the past is related to unobservable and
persistent district-level characteristics, the strategy may still overestimate the benefits of
immigration.
To address this issue, I complement the strategy by exploiting the time variation
introduced by the policy change. The time variation allows me to control for district-
level fixed effects. I also control for area-wide trends. Therefore, I can address the problem
pointed out by Borjas (1999) of serially correlated shocks causing the immigration clusters
in the first place.
10I control for NUTS2-time dummies to capture local economic-wide shocks. There are 34 such areas
in England.
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Spillover effects and open economy adjustments are some weaknesses of using an iden-
tification that relies on spatial differences across locations. For example, it is possible
that an increase in immigration in one location displaces native workers to another lo-
cation with fewer immigrants. I cannot rule out this possibility. Accordingly, my results
should be interpreted as local effects, and care should be taken when assessing the effects
at higher levels of aggregation.
To construct the cross-sectional measure of ex ante immigration clusters, I use the
proportion of Eastern European workers in an English district as of 2001.11 The average
proportion of Eastern European workers is 2.3%, with a standard deviation of 2.1%.12
To exploit the time variation from the policy and control for unobservable district char-
acteristics, my measure of immigration exposure is the interaction between the ex -ante
immigration cluster, an indicator for the policy announcement, and another indicator for
the policy implementation.
The main identification assumption is that all different unobservable factors that
may drive the outcome variables are time invariant, conditional on controls, and can
be controlled for with a fixed effects specification. To provide evidence in favor of this
assumption, Figures 6 and 7 present the graphical results of a regression of the relevant
outcome variable on the relevant fixed effects and the interactions of the indicators and
the cross-sectional exposure measure. The specification controls for area-time dummies
and the relevant fixed effects; firm fixed effects for fixed assets, employees, sales, and
average remuneration; and district fixed effects for firm creation and new Eastern Eu-
ropean registrations. The figures also report the 95% confidence intervals. Because the
intensive margin data are yearly, there are only two observations pre-treatment. Hence,
I can estimate only one coefficient in the pre-treatment period. For firm creation and
new EU8 registrations, I rely on quarterly data. Therefore, Figure 7 provides coefficient
estimates up to four periods before the policy announcement.
All the coefficients before the policy announcement are statistically indistinguishable
from zero. Therefore, I cannot reject the hypothesis of no differential trends in the pre-
treatment period. As long as this assumption also holds for the post-treatment period,
which is not testable, the reduced-form regressions provide an estimation of the causal
effect of ex ante immigration clusters on future immigration, the intensive margin invest-
ment, and firm creation.
The interpretation of the reduced-form effects relies purely on the identifying assump-
11My analysis is restricted to England because of data availability.
12The ONS did not separate the EU8 group in the 2001 Census. Instead, they provide the number of
workers from a group called EUplus, which accounts for what is now known as EU8 plus Bulgaria and
Romania. Alternatively, the ONS provides data on Polish workers, a predominant group. These data are
less accurate because the ONS only reports aggregate data if at least 15 workers are identified. As a result,
the Polish group has more missing districts. However, even when using ex ante Polish workers as the
source of cross-sectional variation, results in investment, employment, and firm creation are significant
and exhibit the same signs. Nonetheless, average within-firm average remuneration decreases.
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tions discussed before. However, Figure 7 shows a positive and significant relationship
between the interaction of policy and ex ante immigration clusters on new EU8 reg-
istration. Table 6 shows a positive and significant relationship between an interaction
that combines the policy announcement and implementation into one indicator function
and the immigration exposure measure. This paper uses this fact to proceed to an in-
strumental variable (IV) estimation of new EU8 registrations on corporate-level capital
investments and on the creation of new firms. Contrary to the reduced-form estimates,
the IV estimation has a direct economic interpretation.
For IV to provide a causal estimation of the local average treatment effect in a het-
erogeneous effect model, four assumptions must be satisfied (Imbens and Angrist, 1994).
First, a first stage between the instrument and the independent variable must exist. Ev-
idence points in favor of this assumption. Second, conditional on controls, treatment
must be as good as randomly assigned. This assumption is the same as that required for
identification using my difference-in-differences strategy. Third the instrument affects the
outcome variable only through the variable of interest, an assumption known as the ex-
clusion restriction. Fourth, the instrument affects the variable of interest in one direction
only, an assumption known as monotonicity.
The IV estimation comes at a cost. In general, it is more difficult to satisfy the
identifying assumptions for IV than for difference-in-differences. Furthermore, because
the policy is not immediately implemented, there might be anticipation between the an-
nouncement and the implementation. There are employment restrictions for immigrants
in this window, but not for firm creation or for investment. Therefore, I need to combine
the effects of the announcement and the policy in a single interaction term with the ex
ante immigration measure. This makes the estimation less precise.
However, IV provides a direct estimation of the effect of the increase of new regis-
tered workers on the outcome variables. If the identifying assumptions hold, IV can be
interpreted as the causal effect of gross increases in new EU8 registration on firm-level
investments and firm creation.
5 Main results
5.1 Predicting the allocation of new EU8 registrations
Before I document the effects of immigration on investment, I test whether the measure
of immigration exposurethe ex ante immigration clusters interacted with the policy
positively predicts immigration after the policy shock.
To generate the measure of immigration exposure, I collect the data from the 2001
Census. The Census does not separate the EU8, but accounts for a group that includes
the EU8 plus other two countries: Romania and Bulgaria. I use this group to construct
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my proxy for the ex ante proportion of workers. 13
I test whether the interaction between immigration clusters and the policy predicts
future patterns using the following specification:
ShareNewRegisteredWorkersEU8dt = αd + αct+
+ β1FractionEasternd ∗ PostAnnouncet+
+ β2FractionEasternd ∗ PostImplementt + εdt.
ShareNewRegisteredWorkersEU8dt measures the proportion of NINO registrations
issued in a quarter divided by the number of workers in 2001. I normalize by workers
in 2001 to avoid the mechanical increase in the denominator caused by the immigration
policy change. Changes in the share of registered workers can be interpreted as a shift
in the labor supply. αd is district-level fixed effects that account for time-invariant unob-
servables. αct is an area-time dummy to account for local-level shocks. An area covers a
group of contiguous districts. Area refers to the NUTS2 statistical aggregation from the
Office of National Statistics (ONS). This aggregation covers neighboring districts all over
England. There are 34 such areas, covering around 10 districts each. FractionEasternd is
the ex ante proportion of workers who are Eastern European nationals.14 PostAnnouncet
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 after the expansion is announced in the
second quarter of 2003. PostImplementt is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1
after the implementation of the expansion in May 2004. The time series goes from the
first quarter of 2002 until the fourth quarter of 2006.
The main specification controls for area-quarter fixed effects. Therefore, the variation
between districts inside an area-time determines the source of identification in this em-
pirical strategy. For example, within an area-time, like Inner London in a specific year,
the identification captures the effect across different districts.
Table 5, Panel A, shows that the measure of exposure (i.e., ex ante proportion of
Eastern workers) positively and significantly predicts an increase of new registrations,
both after the policy announcement and after the policy implementation. The effect is
larger after policy implementation. Accounting for both the announcement and imple-
mentation of the policy, a one-standard-deviation change in the ex ante ratio of Eastern
European leads to an additional quarterly flow of 0.15% new workers, as a proportion of
the initial workforce in 2001.
13The ONS also reports the number of Polish workers, the most prevalent nationality among the EU8
group, per district. I can also use the data that account for Polish nationals separately. I prefer to use
the Eastern European group, which better predicts future immigration patterns. Moreover, the ONS
reports the number of immigrants only when that number surpasses 15 workers in a local authority. The
Polish group is a subset of EUplus and, hence, has more missing data.
14That is, EU8 plus Romania and Bulgaria.
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To provide better economic interpretation, I separate districts by a dummy,HighFractiond
, which takes the value of 1 if the district has an above-median proportion of Eastern
European workers and 0 if it has a value below. Table 5, Panel B, provides the results.
Combining the effect of the announcement and the policy, every quarter, highly exposed
districts receive an increase in the flow of workers equivalent to 0.15% of the initial work-
force in 2001, that is, the same as the standardized result using the continuous measure.
As a comparison, over the 20th Century, the average yearly UK employment growth
was 0.5% (Lindsay, 2003). Taking 2001 as the base year and assuming the rate of growth
to be constant year by year, the increase in labor supply by 2004 is approximately 0.51%
over a year, or 0.13% over a quarter. Therefore, a one-standard-deviation shift in the
ex ante immigration cluster causes an effect larger than the average labor force growth.
This is an economically meaningful shock.15
The results are robust and even more significant if I use a yearly frequency and control
for area-year dummies. This result is also important because the financial data are only
available at a yearly frequency. Hence, the effect within firms is only analyzed at a yearly
frequency. Alternatively, as a robustness check I separate the effect of announcement and
policy in two non-overlapping variables. Both the announcement and the implementation
are significant, but the effect of the implementation is larger.
5.2 District-level investment
In the standard model with homogeneous labor, an increase in labor supply makes cap-
ital relatively more scarce and, therefore, more valuable. In labor economics, researchers
typically assume that, in the short-term, capital is fixed and labor is not (Borjas, 2014).
However, if capital markets are efficient, there is less reason to believe that the capital
adjustments should lag labor flows. It is possible that capital takes time to build, but, in
this setting, firms could increase capital in anticipation of the open policy. On the other
hand, until the policy was implemented, firms had restrictions on hiring foreign workers.
In this paper, intensive margin investment refers to long-term physical capital in-
vestment. Since, under the accounting conventions, only changes in fixed assets can be
interpreted as long-term capital investments, I use this measure. The effects are positive,
but not significant, if I measure the effects over total assets and restrict the sample to
firms that have positive fixed assets.
In this section, I present evidence that fixed capital investment increases for the
average firm in anticipation of the change in immigration policy. More importantly,
capital flows to locations where it becomes more valuable: districts that are expected to
15To provide this back-of-the-envelope calculation, I take year 2001, my base year, as a 100. I measure
the total change in the index from 2003 to 2004. The change is equivalent to 0.51. As a percentage of
the base year, this is 0.51%.
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have a bigger influx of immigrants after the open border policy. Nonetheless, the change
is only a one-off event. If I combine the effect of the announcement and the policy, the
increase in investment is not statistically significant.
Because of data constraints, I report regressions of fixed assets at a yearly frequency.
The regression uses all firms in the sample, both newly incorporated and previously
existing firms, and measures how the average fixed assets of a firm located in a particular
district change when exposed to immigration changes. To calculate the district-level
averages, I first take the logarithm of fixed assets for each firm and then take the average
within each district-year.16 The results are described using the following equation:
ln(yit) = αi + αct+
+ β1FractionEasternd ∗ PostAnnouncet+
β2FractionEasternd ∗ PostImplementt + εdt.
Table 6, Panel A, shows that fixed assets significantly increase after the announce-
ment, but they decrease, though not significantly, after the implementation of the policy.
After the EU expansion announcement, a one-standard-deviation increase in the exposure
measure increases fixed assets at the district level by 1.8%.17 If I subsume the announce-
ment and implementation of the policy in a single dummy variable and interact it with
the ex ante immigration cluster, the effect is positive and equivalent to an increase of
1.9% on fixed assets. However, this result is not statistically significant.
Panel D of Table 6 presents the results of the effect of an increase in the share of
new EU8 registration on fixed asset investment for all firms in a district. The regression
controls for district fixed effects and area-time dummies. The sign is positive, but not
significant. Table 6 also shows the elasticity of the average wage within a district to
an increase in the share of Eastern European immigrants. Even though, the signs are
negative, they are statistically insignificant.
The district-level regressions combine the two margins in which investment can react
to an increase in labor supply. On the one hand, investment can increase in the intensive
margin, as existing firms increase capital expenditures to incorporate incoming workers.
In the extensive margins, the labor supply increase may make it easier for new firms to
enter the market. I disentangle these effects next.
16The advantage of this approach, as explained in Borjas (2014), is the interpretation of the average.
The average of the log is the geometric mean. On the other hand, the log of the average does not have
a similar interpretation. Fortunately, in this setting, the two options yield qualitatively similar results.
17The standard deviation of the immigration clusters is 0.021. The regression is log-level, so %
∆y=100*(eβ − 1) for every unit x increases.
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5.3 Firm-level results
In this section I use firm-level data to provide evidence that the increase in investment
in long-term capital is significant for firms that were created before 2001 only at the
moment of the announcement. The effects are not persistent on average, but they are
persistent for a particular sector: construction. When I study the effects over total assets,
stark differences emerge. The construction sector also experiences a significant, persistent
increase in total assets. Nonetheless, for the service sector, the data show a significant
decrease in total asset investment. This does not mean that investment in the knowledge
and in the service sectors decrease as a whole. The margin of adjustment is different in
these sectors. Later, I will show that the total number of firms created in these sectors
significantly increases.
These results are relevant for two reasons. First, I document results consistent with
complementarities between Eastern European migration and long-term fixed capital in-
vestment for the construction sector. This result is not obvious. The complementarities
depend on the skill composition of the incoming workforce. In particular, immigration
could replace capital in automatized industries (Lewis, 2011). Evidence of an increase in
capital accumulation supports complementarities between immigrant workers and cap-
ital investment. Second, for immigration to decrease average wages in the short-term,
capital should lag labor (Borjas, 2014). I show that the flow of capital, at least in the
United Kingdom during 2004, anticipated the labor flows from immigration. This is a
potential explanation for why the search for negative wage effects from immigration has
been elusive in the labor literature.18
ln(yit) = αi + αct+
+ β1FractionEasternd ∗ PostAnnouncet+
β2FractionEasternd ∗ PostImplementt + εdt
In this regression I control for alphai, that is, firm-level fixed effects. I also control
for area-time dummies. The regression reports, within a geographical area-time, how
much firms located in a high ex ante Eastern European immigration district increase
their fixed assets compared to firms located in a low Eastern European district. As a
robustness check, and to diminish multicollinearity concerns, I separate the effect of the
announcement and the implementation in two non-overlapping variables. The estimation
of the effect of the announcement is quantitatively similar and significant. The effect of
the implementation remains insignificant.
18See Kerr and Kerr (2011) for a survey of the economic impacts of immigration on employment and
on wages.
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In Table 7, Panel A, I document a significant increase in fixed assets within firms after
the announcement of the EU expansion. To ease interpretations, I provide standardized
results for the reduced-form regression. A one-standard-deviation increase in the size
of the ex ante immigration cluster translates into an increase of approximately 1% in
fixed assets. The increase in the number of employees within firms after the policy
implementation is quantitatively similar. A one-standard-deviation increase in the ex
ante immigration cluster translates into an increase of 0.76% in the number of employees.
These results are in line with the particularities of the policy. Before the policy
implementation, firms could not hire EU8 nationals without issuing a work permit. The
United Kingdom lifted the restriction in 2004. Firms could invest more in expectation
of a labor supply increase from the open policy implementation, but could not yet hire
new immigrants. If capital takes time to build, the result that fixed capital investment
precedes the labor supply shock is natural.
Second, I explore the effects of immigration exposure sales per employee. This is
a proxy for productivity. As Peri (2002) shows, immigration can also affect firm-level
productivity. In Table 7, I show that the effects are positive and statistically significant
only after the announcement, that is, before foreign workers can be hired by the firm.
This effect disappears when I combine the effects of the announcement and the policy
implementation. Therefore, the data do not support the claim that immigration increased
productivity within existing firms.
One important cost immigration may have on the native workers is a potential decrease
in their remuneration. Firms could also face different factor prices when immigration
increases. A positive labor supply shock could reduce average labor costs. I estimate
the average employee remuneration within the firm. I find no evidence of a significant
reduction in average remuneration. Table 7, Panel A, shows the within-firm effects for
the average worker in the firm and for the highest-paid director. Both results are not
significant.19
I adopt an IV approach to measure the effect of immigration on capital investment,
employment, and sales per employee. For IV to be interpreted as the local average
treatment effect, the instrument needs to satisfy three assumptions in addition to the
difference-in-differences strategy, which only requires random assignment conditional on
controls.
First, a first stage must exist. This assumption is directly testable, and in Table 7, I
find evidence that the ex ante immigration measure significantly predicts future migration
patterns .20 Second, the exclusion restriction, which in this case requires that my measure
19Dustmann and Glitz (2011) use a different methodology but find similar results. They find within-
firm factor price adjustments are not significant, but changes in factor intensities are.
20The F-stat of a regression on the excluded instruments is well above the minimum requirement (i.e.,
F-stat = 10) suggested by Stock and Yogo (2005).
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of ex ante immigration exposure affects the outcome variable only through changes in the
share of new Eastern European workers, must exist. Third, ex ante immigration exposure
affects future immigration patterns monotonically.
If these assumptions hold, the IV estimation provides a direct estimate of the effects
of immigration on firm-level fixed asset investment, employment, and sales per employee.
The reduced-form results from the difference-in-differences estimation do not have this
interpretation. In Table 7, I report the effects of an increase in the share of EU8-registered
workers on the change in fixed assets, employment, and sales per employee. The data
show, on average, no permanent effects within the firm through productivity adjustments,
factor price adjustments, or investment. There is a significant and permanent increase in
firm-level employment, but only after the policy implementation.
At the same time, the data show differential effects when separating firms by economic
sectors. Table 9, Panel B, combines the effect of the announcement and the policy into
one indicator variable. It treats the interaction between ex ante immigration exposure
and the announcement as the explanatory variable. This result can be interpreted as a
permanent shift to the outcome variable of interest after the announcement of the EU
expansion. There is a permanent and significant increase in fixed asset investment only
for construction. Table 9, Panel C, shows the estimate for an IV regression in which
the proportion of new EU8 registrations per worker is instrumented by the interaction
between ex ante immigration clusters and the expansion announcement. A 1% increase
in the proportion of new EU8 registers in a district translates into an increase of 1.26%
in fixed asset investments at the firm level for construction firms located in that district.
For total assets, the increase is equivalent to 19.1%, which is not statistically significant.
For the service and the knowledge sectors, there is no persistent increase in fixed
asset investment. Moreover, for the service sector, the total assets significantly decrease.
In the next section, I document another margin by which the changes are persistent.
Immigration increases the rate at which firms are created in the economy.
5.4 Firm creation
In this subsection, I explore the effects of immigration on investment in new firms
across two dimensions. First, I show the effects of immigration exposure on the number
of firms created at the district level. I analyze these effects across different sectors of the
economy. Second, I explore the effects on the size of the new firms.
Because I observe the exact date at which each firm is incorporated, I estimate re-
gressions at a quarterly frequency. Annual regressions provide consistent results. The
following equation summarizes the main specification:
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ln(Firmsdt) = αd + αct+
+ β1FractionEasternd ∗ PostAnnouncet+
+ β2FractionEasternd ∗ PostImplementt + εdt.
F irmsdt is the total number of firms created in a district. There are no firm fixed
effects in this specification because firm creation is measured at the district level. The
time series goes from the first quarter of 2002 until the fourth quarter of 2006.
In Table 6, I show firm creation significantly increases in districts with higher ex ante
exposure to immigration. After the announcement, a one-standard-deviation increase in
ex ante Eastern European workers correlates with an increase of 1.78% in firm creation.
Furthermore, the policy implementation increases firm creation by an additional 3, which
is an economically and statistically significant effect.
I use IV to show the effect of an increase in immigration flow in firm creation. Table
6 provides the estimates. The IV estimation shows a significant increase in firm creation.
The average quarterly flow of EU8 workers in the sample is around 0.20% of the labor
force. The IV estimation shows that an additional 0.20% quarterly flow of EU8 workers
as a proportion initial workforce translates into a 6.7% increase in firm creation at the
district level.
Next, I examine whether the new firms created after the immigration policy change
are different in size compared with the firms created before the policy change. Normally,
young firms do not report their assets for the year of incorporation. To minimize this
source of attrition, I collect data on fixed assets for each company either, in the year of
incorporation or one year after. Still attrition is important. I summarize each district by
the average of the natural logarithm of the fixed assets of created firms. Table 6 shows
the results. The estimates are inconclusive mainly because of the large standard errors,
but the sign suggests that these new firms are smaller than the ones created before 2003.
I combine the effects of the announcement and the policy implementation and find a
one-standard-deviation increase in immigration ex ante exposure translates into a 0.65%
decrease in the fixed assets of the average entering the market.
After dividing the effects among the sectors, the data show another source of hetero-
geneity. Table 10, Panel B, shows a significant increase in the number of firms in the
knowledge sector, a sector characterized by human -capital-intensive tasks.21 Panel C
presents the IV estimates. New EU8 registrations, which are equivalent to 1% in the
labor force, are associated with a significant increase of 7.59% in the number of knowl-
edge firms. The data show a similar result for the service sector, although the skills
21I provide a list of the industries included in this sector in the appendix.
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needed for these tasks are lower than those needed for the knowledge sector. Table 10,
Panel C, documents that a 1% increase in new EU8 workers registrations translates into
a significant increase of 9.96% in firms created in the service sector.
This increase in firm creation is associated with evidence of competition with pre-
existing firms in these sectors. Table 7 shows that pre-existing firms decrease their total
assets in the service and in the knowledge sectors. The decrease is statistically significant
for the service sector. A 1% increase in the share of immigration-driven labor supply
decreases the average service firm by 12.8%. For the knowledge sector, the decrease,
although not statistically significant, is 7.73%.
The data show no significant effects for the remuneration of the average worker within
the firm in any of the main economic sectors studied. It does show a significant decrease in
remuneration for the highest-paid director in the service sector after the policy implemen-
tation. If I combine the effects of the policy announcement and policy implementation,
the highest-paid directors experience a decrease in their pay in the service and in the
knowledge sectors. The results are not statistically significant, but they are economi-
cally meaningful. In the knowledge sector, an 1% increase in Eastern European worker
registrations as a proportion of existing workers decreased the highest-paid director's re-
muneration by 12%. For the service sector, the decrease is equivalent to 11%. This is
consistent with the increase in competition from the newly incorporated firms.
There is still one important question about firm creation. The creation of new firms
might increase the probability of firms leaving. My sample comprises all dead and existing
firms over the sample from 2001 until 2006. Firms are forced to provide information to
Company's House every year. I assume a firm dies if no information is provided after a
particular year or if the firm is officially desincorporated. In the Appendix I show there
are no effects after the announcement and implementation of the policy in the destruction
of firms. This is true for both the number of firms destroyed and for the probability of a
firm dying over a year after it is created.
5.5 Robustness
One potential shortcoming of my identification strategy is that spillovers across dis-
tricts might bias the results towards zero. For example, if migrants tend to work in
different districts than those in which they register, districts close to Eastern European
hubs may also experience increases in investment or potential changes in wages. To avoid
this problem I replicate the main results of my paper at a different aggregation level. I
use Travel to Work Areas (TTWA) as constructed using the census of 2001. According
to the ONS, TTWAs are areas constructed in a way that resemble labour markets, areas
in which workers both live and work (Prothero, 2016). If the expected increase in labor
force from the policy change induces firms to invest more, the effects should be larger at
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the higher aggregation level. This is because The cost of a worker moving across different
travel to work areas is higher.
The aggregation comes at a cost. The coarser level does not allow me to control for
NUTS2 area trends because travel to work areas might be larger than NUTS2 areas. If
cities suffer shocks that are particular to them and happen at the same time than the
policy announcement, my identification would not provide causal effects. To mitigate this
issue, I control for region trends.22 As expected, the investment results are even stronger
and more significant at this level of aggregation. There is significantly more firm creation
and fixed asset investment in travel to work areas that had higher cluster of Eastern
European workers ex-ante. However, the effects on wages are still insignificant.23.
6 Cultural proximity and social ties or changes in worker's
skill-mix
In this section I explore the potential mechanisms behind the effects on existing firm
investment and firm creation. Are the changes in investment and number of employees at
the firm level related to social ties between firm directors and the immigrants? If cultural
or social factors play an important role in the decision to invest, it should be the case
that firms with EU8 directors benefit more from the immigration policy change.24 To
test this hypothesis, I collect data on the nationalities of directors for all firms registered
in the United Kingdom. I define EU8 majority firms as those in which at least half of
the directors in the board are from Eastern European origin as of 2001. The advantage
of using data from 2001 is that the board composition is less likely to be affected by the
immigration policy. The results are similar if I use contemporaneous board composition.
First, I test whether existing firms with a majority of EU8 directors invest more. I
estimate the following equation:
22There are 9 regions in England.
23See appendix for the regressions under this level of aggregation
24Munshi (2003) shows that networks play an important role in worker earnings. More recently,
Burchardi and Hassan (2013) and Burchardi, Chaney, and Hassan (2016) showed that social ties and
migration may be related to more entrepreneurship and investment.
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ln(yit) = αi + αct+
+ β1FractionEasternd ∗ PostAnnouncet+
+ β2FractionEasternd ∗ PostImplementt+
+ β3EU8Firmi ∗ PostAnnouncet+
+ β4EU8Firmi ∗ PostImplementt+
+ β5FractionEasternd ∗ EU8Firmi ∗ PostAnnouncet+
+ β6FractionEasternd ∗ EU8Firmi ∗ PostImplementt + εdt.
The coefficients of interest in this setting are β5 and β6. They represent the triple
interaction of a firm with a majority of EU8 directors ex ante, a firm located in a district
with high immigration exposure ex ante, and the policy change.
Table 8 shows the within-firm regressions. I only report the relevant coefficients.
Although the results are not significant, investment for EU8-directed firms in fixed assets
decreases. Employment results are positive, but they are also not statistically significant.
On aggregate, this channel does not explain either fixed asset investment or employment
decisions.
On the other hand, I can test whether EU8 directors are more likely to create firms
after the policy change. I test whether the proportion of firms created by EU8 majority
firms increases as a proportion of the total. First, both EU8 majority firm creation and
UK majority firm creation increase. However, EU8 firms increase also proportionally to
total firms in a district after the announcement. I do not have data on the time of arrival
of the directors, but the differential effects between the new and the existing EU8 firms
suggest these directors are coming to the United Kingdom.
As discussed by Lewis (2011, 2013), the increase in investment depends on the skill
composition of the labor supply shock. Furthermore, from Manacorda, Manning and
Wadsworth (2012) there is evidence that immigration to the United Kingdom is predom-
inantly high-skill. High-skill labor is more likely to complement capital. Moreover, an
increase in the inflow of high-skill labor can also explain the significant increase in the
incorporation of knowledge firms.
In this section, I use district aggregate data to provide evidence of two patterns in the
data. First, the log odds of high-skill over low-skill labor immigrants in relation to the
same ratio for British workers is negatively correlated with ex ante immigration in the
cross section. The log odds ratio measure selection and sorting since Roy (1951 ).25 This
implies immigrants positively sort into districts with higher ex ante immigration. Second,
the change in the log odds of immigration by high- to low-skill workers before and after
25For an application, see Grogger and Hanson (2011).
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the policy is positively correlated to the immigration exposure measure. This implies
that the policy changed the skill distribution of immigrants toward high-skill labor.
To measure the proportion of Eastern European workers within a district, I rely on
census data. These data are provided for 2001 and for 2011. Skill in this setting is
only measured by educational attainment. High-skill workers are those with at least
a higher national diploma in the United Kingdom. Low-skill workers are those with
no qualifications. Table 11 shows the ex ante negative selection of Eastern European
immigrants compared to British workers. The log adds positively change when compared
with the 2011 census data. These results suggest an improvement in the selection of new
immigrants to districts that were ex ante more exposed.
7 Conclusion
This paper suggests a causal link between immigration, firm creation, and fixed capital
investment. To identify the relationship between immigration and investment, I rely on a
modified version of the shift-share measures used in the labor literature. I combine the ex
ante clusters of immigrants from the same nationalities with a natural experiment: the
modification in immigration policy by the United Kingdom triggered by the expansion of
the European Union. This time variation allows me to control for local economic shocks
and, therefore, reduces the concerns of endogeneity.
My results suggest firms responses to immigration occur in anticipation of future
labor flows after the policy implementation. Once the EU announced its expansion, firm
creation in districts with a high ex ante proportion of workers increased significantly.
For pre-existing firms, the adjustments are different. I document a permanent increase in
fixed capital and total asset investment only for the construction sector. I find no evidence
that the average firm-level remuneration changes after the change in immigration policy
in any sector.
I document results consistent with an increase of competition in the sectors in which
adjustment occurs through the incorporation of new firms. For the service and the knowl-
edge sectors, the increase in the number of firms came at the expense of existing firms.
Firms are smaller in terms of total assets. I find no evidence that this adjustment af-
fects the average worker. I do find evidence that it decreases the compensation of the
highest-paid directors at firms in industries where the number of firms increases.
I also explore the channels through which the adjustment happens. EU8 nationals
create more firms as a proportion of all firms created in districts more exposed to the
change in immigration policy. On the other hand, existing firms with EU8 majority
boards do not increase investment in fixed assets. This implies that the increase in
EU8 firm creation is more likely caused by new immigrants rather than firms employing
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existing immigrants. Furthermore, investment is not determined by previously existing
ties.
On the other hand, I find support for the hypothesis that immigration changes the
labor skill composition. I find correlations that suggest that, after the open border policy,
the skill selection of immigrants significantly improved. Furthermore, the increase in firm
creation concentrates in sectors that rely on human capital, the knowledge sector, or that
rely on labor intensive tasks, the service sector. Finally, the only wage effects I find are
concentrated on the remuneration of the highest-paid directors in the service and in the
knowledge sectors.
My results are economically relevant for the UKs immigration policy. Corporate
investment increases in anticipation of immigration labor supply even in the short-term.
Moreover, immigration also increases the number of firms created in sectors that rely on
human capital. Evidence in the United Kingdom points to adjustments through factor
investments and the creation of new firms, rather than through factor.
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9 Figures
Figure 1: Timeline of immigration decisions by different EU members
This figure summarizes the years in which European countries which are already members of the EU
open their labor markets to nationals from the newly admitted countries. Opening refers to allowing
nationals from those countries to work without a Visa or sponsorship application process.
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Figure 2: New registrations from EU8 and EU15
NINO is an abbreviation for National Insurance Number. EU8 refers to countries admitted to the EU
in 2004. EU15 are countries that already belonged to the EU by 2004.
30
Figure 3: New registrations from EU8 and non-EU Eastern Europe
NINO is an abbreviation for National Insurance Number. EU8 refers to countries admitted to the EU
in 2004. Non admitted EU are Bulgaria and Romania. These are European countries that were not
part of the EU by 2004 and were also not incorporated in the expansion. They were incorporated in
the next expansion, but obtained labor rights within the UK in 2014.
Figure 4: Quarterly new registrations of nationals from countries admitted in 2004
I rank the districts according to the shares of pre-existing workers share of workers from Eastern
Europe. I then assign each district to a quartile.
31
Figure 5: New firms incorporated per quarter
I rank the districts according to the shares of pre-existing workers share of workers from Eastern
Europe. I then assign each district to a quartile.
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Figure 6: Estimation of regression coefficients pre and post Policy
Coefficient estimates of each variable of interest on an interaction between ex ante immigration and a
dummy variable. 95% confidence intervals reported in red. The vertical lines represent the open policy
announcement and implementation.
(a) Share of new EU8 registrations
(b) Logarithm of total new firms created in a district
33
.6
Figure 2: Regression estimates of pre-treatment trends within firms
Coefficient estimates of each variable of interest on an interaction between ex ante immigration and a
dummy variable. 95% confidence intervals reported in red. The vertical lines represent the open policy
announcement and implementation. For firm-level data I have only two periods before the
announcement. Therefore, there is only one coefficient estimate before the announcement.
(a) Logarithm Fixed assets (b) Logarithm Employees
(c) Logarithm Sales (d) Logarithm Average Remuneration
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10 Tables
Table 1: District-level summary statistics for Immigration and Labor Data
All data are from the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP). New registrations refer to new
national insurance numbers issued to incoming workers of all nationalities. EU8 refers to nationals from
countries admitted to the EU in 2004. EU15 refers to nationals from countries that belonged to the
EU before the 2004 expansion. The new countries admitted to EU in 2007 refer to Bulgaria and Romania.
Pre EU8 admission
(2002-2003)
Post EU8 admission
(2004-2007)
New registrations 842.9
(1510.1)
1556.3
(2,471.7)
New registrations EU8 34.3
(98.5)
572.1
(829.8)
New registrations EU15 177.6
(330.8)
236.9
(480.3)
New registrations new to EU 2007 15.8
(48.7)
32.53
(144.8)
New registrations per ex ante
workers (%)
0.93%
(1.31%)
1.82%
(2.13%)
EU8 new registrations per ex ante
workers (%)
0.04%
(0.09%)
0.73%
(0.81%)
EU15 new registrations per ex ante
workers (%)
0.21%
(0.32%)
0.27%
(0.47%)
New to EU 2007 per ex ante
workers (%)
0.02%
(0.04%)
0.04%
(0.14%)
Activity Rate (%) 79.85%
(5.47%)
78.19%
(4.85%)
Workers 72,807
(46,892)
75,659
(49,757.1)
Mean (St Dev) Mean (St Dev)
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Table 2: Firm-level summary statistics on board composition. Firms incorporated before
2000
All data are from BvD's Orbis and Fame databases. UK directors are directors with British nationality.
EU15 includes directors with a nationality from any of the countries that were members of the European
Union before 2004, excluding the UK. EU8 includes nationals from the countries admitted to the
European Union in the 2004 expansion.
Year %Directors from
UK
%Directors from
EU countries
admitted
pre-2004 (EU15)
%Directors from
EU countries
admitted in
2004 (EU8)
Number of firms
2000 90.1%
(29.9%)
4.4%
(20.6%)
0.08%
(2.7%)
771,625
2001 91%
(28.6%)
4.5%
(20.7%)
0.08%
(2.7%)
702,960
2002 91.5%
(27.9%)
4.4%
(20.6%)
0.07%
(2.7%
634,613
2003 91.7%
(27.6%)
4.4%
(20.5%)
0.08%
(2.7%)
584,909
2004 91.8%
(27.4%)
4.4%
(20.5%)
0.07%
(2.7%)
549,130
2005 91.9%
(27.3%)
4.5%
(20.6%)
0.08%
(2.7%)
520,854
2006 91.9%
(27.3%)
4.5%
(20.7%)
0.08%
(2.7%)
500,311
2007 92%
(27.1%)
4.6%
(20.9%)
0.08%
(2.8%)
484,098
2008 92%
(27.2%)
4.7%
(21.1%)
0.08%
(2.9%)
468,542
Mean (St Dev) Mean (St Dev) Mean (St Dev)
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Table 3: Firm-level summary statistics on board composition for firms by year of incor-
poration
All data are from BvD's Orbis and Fame databases. The UK directors are those British nationality.
EU15 includes directors with a nationality from any of the countries that were members of the European
Union before 2004, excluding the UK. EU8 includes nationals from the countries admitted to the
European Union in the 2004 expansion.
Incorporation %Directors from
UK
%Directors from
EU countries
admitted
pre-2004 (EU15)
%Directors from
EU countries
admitted in 2004
(EU8)
Number of
firms
2000 83.5%
(37.1%)
4.6%
(20.9%)
0.1%
(3.2%)
123,487
2001 80.9%
(39.3%)
4.6%
(21%)
0.1%
(3.2%)
124,395
2002 82%
(38.4%)
4.7%
(21.1%)
0.14%
(3.7%)
199,048
2003 80.7%
(39.5%)
5%
(21.7%)
0.26%
(5.1%)
283,884
2004 76.1%
(42.6%)
8%
(27.1%)
0.36%
(6%)
250,750
2005 72.8%
(44.5%)
9.5%
(29.3%)
0.55%
(7.4%)
272,563
2006 72.3%
(44.7%)
9.6%
(29.5%)
0.74%
8.6%
306,941
2007 73.9%
(43.9%)
7.3%
(26%)
0.93%
(9.6%)
363,816
2008 76.2%
(42.6%)
7.7%
(26.7%)
0.96%
(9.8%)
290,796
Mean (St Dev) Mean (St Dev) Mean (St Dev)
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Table 4: Firm-level summary statistics on fixed assets for firms that had at least one employee over the sample
data are from ORBIS and Fame Databases. All numbers are in thousands except employees and number of firms. Number of firms refers to firms that have
data at least on fixed assets. All nominal values are in pounds sterling.
Year Fixed assets Total employee
remuneration
Total directors
remuneration
Number of
employees
Average
employee
remuneration
Remuneration
highest paid
director
Number of firms
2001 497.4
(6,392.7)
487.7
(1,639.7)
289
(688.3)
243
(2,955)
17.4
(38.8)
243.8
(494)
86,788
2002 489.6
(6,753.4)
488.8
(1,357.9)
294.3
(674.5)
243
(2,968)
17.7
(37)
249.7
(463.2)
86,597
2003 476.6
(6,902.1)
494.6
(2,836.8)
305.5
(786.4)
250
(3,091)
17.8
(37.2)
258.3
(659)
86,478
2004 460.2
(3,803.7)
458.8
(1,081.9)
333.7
(891.9)
264
(3,381)
18
(39.8)
260.1
(775.3)
85,104
2005 474.5
(3,916.1)
484.3
(1,131.9)
371.9
(1,062.2)
310
(3,999)
19.3
(43)
268.6
(744.3)
55,889
Mean
(St Dev)
Mean
(St Dev)
Mean
(St Dev)
Mean
(St Dev)
Mean
(St Dev)
Mean
(St Dev)
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Table 5: Allocation of EU8 new registrations at a quarterly frequency
FractionEastern refers to the fraction of workers from the EU8 plus Bulgaria and Romania as of the
2001 census. PostAnnounce is an indicator variable with value one after the announcement of the EU
expansion in the second quarter of 2003. PostImplement is an indicator variable with value one after
the implementation of the open border policy in the second quarter of 2004. All standard errors are
clustered at the district level. Area refers to NUTS2 statistical areas that cover all England.
Panel A: Continuous Exposure Measure
ShareNewRegisteredWorkersEU8dt
FractionEasternd ∗ PostAnnouncet 0.005***
(0.001)
FractionEasternd ∗ PostImplementt 0.07***
(0.007)
AdjR2 0.8275
District FE Yes
Area*Quarter FE Yes
N 7,704
Panel B: Dummy Exposure Measure
ShareNewRegisteredWorkersEU8dt
HighFractionEast8d ∗ PostAnnouncet 0.0000422***
(6.81e-06)
HighFractionEast8d ∗ PostImplementt 0.00146***
(0.00015)
AdjR2 0.7094
District FE Yes
Area*Quarter FE Yes
N 7,704
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Table 6: District-level regressions
FraEast refers to the fraction of workers from the EU8 plus Bulgaria and Romania as of the 2001 census.
Ann is an indicator variable with value one after the announcement of the EU expansion in the second
quarter of 2003. Imp is an indicator variable with value one after the implementation of the open border
policy in the second quarter of 2004. All standard errors are clustered at the district level. All regressions
use district fixed effects and area-time dummies. Fixed assets refer to the average firm fixed assets that
existed in the district. Mean wage is obtained directly from the census data. The district level results
are similar if I use the average employee remuneration from the FAME firm-level data.
Panel A: District-Level Regressions Announcement and Implementation
Quarterly Yearly
ln(Firms) ln(FixedAssets) ln(FixedAssetsNew) ln(MeanWages)
FraEast*Ann 0.84** 0.88* 0.64 -0.25
(0.40) (0.49) (11.25) (0.20)
FraEast*Imp 1.41*** -0.52 -1.18 -0.01
(0.53) (0.64) (0.85) (0.14)
N 7661 1595 1595 1585
Adj R2 0.95 0.93 0.52 0.96
Panel B: First stage policy and announcement combined
NewEU8/L NewEU8/L
FraEast*Ann 0.05*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.20***
(0.006) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
N 4644 1147 1147 1585
F 75.95 109.76 109.76 143.02
Panel C: Reduced form policy and announcement combined
ln(Firms) ln(FixedAssets) ln(FixedAssetsNew) ln(MeanWages)
FraEast*Ann 1.67** 0.82 -0.31 -0.26
(0.71) (0.62) (1.11) (0.22)
N 4644 1147 1147 1585
Adj R2 0.96 0.91 0.57 0.96
Panel D: IV
ln(Firms) ln(FixedAssets) ln(FixedAssetsNew) ln(Wages)
NewEU8/L 32.3** 5.07 -1.93 -1.31
(13.07) (3.94) (6.93) (1.09)
N 4644 1147 1147 1585
Centered R2 0.97 0.94 0.74 0.97
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Table 7: Firm-level regressions, firms incorporated before 2001
FraEast fraction of workers from the EU8 plus Bulgaria and Romania as of the 2001 census. Ann is an indicator variable with value one after the announcement
of the EU expansion. Imp is an indicator variable with value one after the implementation of the open border policy. WorkRem is the average employee
remuneration in the firm. DirRem is the remuneration of the highest paid director. NewEU8/L is the fraction of new EU8 registrations over 2001. Sales/L
is total revenue per worker. K/L is fixed assets per employee. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. All regressions use firm fixed effects and
area-time dummies.
Panel A: Firm-level regressions announcement and implementation
Factor Remunera-
tion
Productivity Factor Adjustments
ln(WorkRem) ln(DirRem) ln(Sales/L) ln(TotalAssets) ln(FixedAssets) ln(Employees) ln(K/L)
FraEast*Ann 0.12 0.29 0.39** -0.24 0.47** -0.11 0.20
(0.14) (0.30) (0.17) (0.29) (0.23) (0.12) (0.22)
FraEast*Imp -0.01 -0.34 -0.10 0.03 0.00 0.36** -0.68**
(0.12) (0.25) (0.23) (0.32) (0.29) (0.11) (0.34)
N 269557 72444 216779 415518 351898 299847 269557
Adj R2 0.98 0.85 0.97 0.85 0.93 0.96 0.95
Panel B: Reduced form announcement and implementation combined
ln(WorkRem) ln(DirRem) ln(Sales/L) ln(TotalAssets) ln(FixedAssets) ln(Employees) ln(K/L)
FraEast*Ann 0.09 -0.14 0.34 -0.49 0.32 0.02 -0.19
(0.18) (0.27) 0.23 (0.35) (0.32) (0.13) (0.27)
N 195362 55153 156546 314628 263638 217446 192206
Adj R2 0.99 0.87 0.98 0.88 0.94 0.96 0.96
Panel C: IV announcement and implementation combined
ln(WorkRem) ln(DirRem) ln(Sales/L) ln(TotalAssets) ln(FixedAssets) ln(Employees) ln(K/L)
NewEU8/L 0.79 -1.17 3.04 -3.94 2.61 0.17 -1.75
(1.56) (2.25) (1.92) 2.69 (2.68) (1.21) (2.45)
N 195362 55153 156546 314628 263638 299847 192206
Centered R2 0.99 0.92 0.98 0.91 0.96 0.98 0.97
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Table 8: Cultural proximity or new entrepreneurs
All standard errors are clustered at the district level. FraEast refers to the proportion of workers from
EU8 plus Romania and Bulgaria by 2001. Ann is an indicator variable that takes value 1 after 2003,
the year the EU expansion was announced. Imp is an indicator variable that takes value 1 after the EU
expansion was implemented. EU8 Firms refer to firms with a majority of members with a EU8 nationality.
Panel A: Differential effects firms with EU8 boards
ln(FixAssets) ln(Employees) ln(K/L)
FrEast*EU8Firm*Announcement 0.06 0.19 (0.41)
(1.49) (0.87) (1.46)
FrEast*EU8Firm*Implementation -0.87 0.79 -0.95
(1.51) (0.59) (1.54)
Interactions Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Area*Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 0.94 0.96 0.96
N 351898 299847 265694
Panel B: New firms board nationalities
ln(UKFirms) ln(EU8FIrms) %EU8Firms
FrEast*Announcement 1.36*** 1.14 0.043***
(0.48) (1.72) (0.01)
FrEast*Implementation 0.46 2.25 0.00
(0.40) (2.33) (0.01)
District FE Yes Yes Yes
Area*Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 0.96 0.62 0.13
N 7661 1196 7657
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Table 9: Intensive margin firm-level results by economic sector
All standard errors are clustered at the district level. All regressions include a firm fixed effects and a year*area dummy. FraEast refers to the proportion of
workers from EU8 plus Romania and Bulgaria by 2001. Ann is an indicator variable that takes value 1 after 2003, the year the EU expansion was announced. Imp
is an indicator variable that takes value 1 after the EU expansion was implemented. NewEu8/L refers to new registrations from EU8 divided by the total num-
ber of workers in 2001. The sectors are knowledge, construction and services. For more information about the construction of these sectors refer to the appendix.
Panel A: Firm Level Regressions Announcement and Implementation
ln(FixedAssets) ln(Employees) ln(TotalAssets) ln(WorkRem.) ln(Dir.Rem.)
FrEast*Ann 0.47 0.99 2.68*** 0.19 -0.44 -0.34 -0.49 2.40* -0.97 0.14 0.26 -0.52 -0.17 0.93 -1.45
(0.68) (0.69) (0.75) (0.27) (0.34) (0.36) (0.76) 1.25 (0.90) (0.52) (0.41) (0.51) (1.14) (0.80) (1.23)
FrEast*Imp 0.03 0.85 0.38 0.11 0.39 0.79 0.52 -0.14 -1.14 -0.60 0.21 0.55 -1.68 0.26 -2.37**
(0.70) (0.62) (1.02) (0.27) (0.45) (0.50) (0.74) (0.77) (1.13) 0.42 (0.54) (0.54) (0.89) (0.99) (1.18)
N 42855 27583 24388 36869 22164 20488 51542 31870 30619 31977 19415 17855 7948 6562 3786
Adj R2 0.91 0.93 0.9 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.84 0.86 0.79 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.9 0.87 0.89
Sector Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv
Panel B: Reduced form policy and announcement combined
ln(FixedAssets) ln(Employees) ln(TotalAssets) ln(WorkRem.) ln(Dir.Rem.)
FrEast*Ann 0.52 1.26** 1.14 0.11 -0.40 0.18 -0.95 2.46* -1.55* -0.24 0.14 -0.76 -1.50 0.55 -1.48
(0.79) (0.61) (1.26) (0.33) (0.37) (0.44) (0.78) 1.45 (0.91) (0.48) (0.39) (0.62) (1.18) (0.99) (1.63)
N 32390 20853 18450 26981 16104 14889 39325 24207 23358 23461 14067 12979 6330 5117 2960
Adj R2 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.86 0.88 0.82 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.91 0.89 0.89
Sector Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv
Panel C: IV
ln(FixedAssets) ln(Employees) ln(TotalAssets) ln(WorkRem.) ln(Dir.Rem.)
NewEU8/L 4.52 10.11* 10.25 1.09 -3.69 1.74 -8.04 19.13 -13.72* -2.20 1.29 -7.28 -12.82 5.10 -11.79
(6.91) (5.28) (11.90) (3.10) (3.40) (4.20) 6.66 11.83 (8.09) (4.49) (3.71) (6.32) (10.13) (9.08) (12.77)
N 32390 20853 18450 26981 16104 14889 39325 24207 23358 23461 14067 12979 6330 5117 2960
Centered R2 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.90 0.91 0.87 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.95 0.93 0.93
Sector Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv
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Table 10: District-level firm creation regressions by economic sector
All standard errors are clustered at the district level. FraEast refers to the proportion of workers from
EU8 plus Romania and Bulgaria by 2001. Ann is an indicator variable that takes value 1 after 2003,
the year the EU expansion was announced. Imp is an indicator variable that takes value 1 after the
EU expansion was implemented. NewEu8/L refers to new registrations from EU8 divided by the total
number of workers in 2001. The sectors are knowledge, construction and services. For more information
about the construction of these sectors refer to the appendix. EU8 firms refer to firms with a majority
of EU8 national in the boards at the moment of incorporation.
Panel A: District-Level Regressions Announcement and Imple-
mentation
ln(Firms) ln(EU8Firms)
FraEast*Ann 0.20 -1.15 0.48 -0.88 2.38 -1.28
(0.89) (0.89) (0.81) (1.46) (1.65) (1.40)
FraEast*Imp 0.33 2.24** 1.98 1.72 -1.27 -0.05
(0.71) (0.91) 1.08 (1.70) (1.78) (1.52)
N 1914 1909 1912 1839 1793 1819
Adj R2 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.82 0.75 0.82
Sector Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv
Panel B: Reduced form policy and announcement combined
ln(Firms) ln(EU8Firms)
FraEast*Ann 1.62** 0.82 2.04** 0.58 1.89 -1.14
(0.81) (0.93) (0.99) (1.39) (1.69) (1.24)
N 1594 1592 1593 1535 1506 1520
Adj R2 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.82 0.77 0.82
Sector Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv
Panel C: IV
ln(Firms) ln(EU8Firms)
NewEU8/L 7.32** 3.72 9.22** 2.79 8.58 -5.27
(3.60) (4.06) (4.52) (6.66) (7.51) (5.69)
N 1594 1592 1593 1535 1506 1520
Centered R2 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.88 0.84 0.87
Sector Know Constr Serv Know Constr Serv
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Table 11: Selection of migrants
FraEast refers to the proportion of workers from EU8 plus Romania and Bulgaria by 2001. The first two regressions are cross-sectional. The last regression
measures the change between 2011 and 2001 and can be interpreted as accounting for a district fixed effect. All regressions control for the NUTS2 Areas.
ln(OddsEU8)-ln(OddsUK) ln(OddsEU8)-ln(OddsUK) ln(OddsEU8)-ln(OddsUK)
FrEast -7.58*** -1.79 5.79***
(1.28) (1.68) (1.85)
Area FE Yes Yes Yes
Census Year 2001 2011 Change
Adj R2 0.94 0.96 0.96
N 323 323 323
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Appendix
Table A.1: Most frequent industries by firms incorporated in 2001
NACE Industry Name Incorporated
2001
% Over To-
tal 2001
Incorporated
2006
% Over To-
tal 2006
8299 Other business sup-
port activities
22,302 16.9 51,634 21.72
7022 Business and other
management con-
sulting activities
7,380 5.59 12,003 5.05
6209 Other Information
technology and
computer service
activities
6,847 5.19 8,751 3.68
6920 Accounting book-
keeping and auditing
activities; tax con-
sultancy
3,704 2.81 2,945 1.24
6820 Renting and operat-
ing of own or leased
real state
3,626 2.75 4,345 1.83
4110 Development of
building projects
3,540 2.68 6,826 2.87
4120 Construction of
buildings
3,345 2.53 6,025 2.53
9609 Other personal ser-
vice activities
3,193 2.42 6,342 2.67
6202 Computer consul-
tancy activities
2,695 2.04 6,913 2.91
5829 Other software pub-
lishing
2,512 1.9 494 0.21
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Table A.2: EU8 firm creation in top 10 industries
NACE Industry Name Incorporated
by EU8
board 2001
% Over
EU8
2001
Incorporated
by EU8
board 2001
% Over
EU8
2006
% In-
crease
8299 Other business
support activities
21 21.88 250 16.93 10.90
7022 Business and
other manage-
ment consulting
activities
2 2.08 30 2.03 14.00
6209 Other Informa-
tion technology
and computer
service activities
3 3.13 25 1.69 7.33
6920 Accounting book-
keeping and au-
diting activities;
tax consultancy
2 2.08 13 0.88 5.50
6820 Renting and op-
erating of own or
leased real state
1 1.04 3 0.2 2.00
4110 Development of
building projects
2 2.08 22 1.49 10.00
4120 Construction of
buildings
3 3.13 94 6.36 30.33
9609 Other personal
service activities
4 4.17 80 5.42 19.00
6202 Computer con-
sultancy activi-
ties
1 1.04 36 2.44 35.00
5829 Other software
publishing
0 0 1 0.07 NA
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Table A.3: Industries classified as knowledge sector
NACE Code Industry
5821 Publishing of Computer Games
5829 Other Software Publishing
6110 Wired telecommunications activities
6120 Wireless telecommunications activities
6130 Satellite telecommunications activities
6190 Other telecommunications activities
6201 Computer programming activities
6202 Computer consultancy activities
6203 Computer facilities management activities
6209 Other information technology and computer service ac-
tivities
6311 Data processing, hosting and related activities
6312 Web portals
7022 Business and other management consulting activities
7111 Architectural activities
7112 Engineering activities and related technical consultant
7120 Technical testing and analysis
7211 Research and experimental development on biotechnol-
ogy
7219 Other research and experimental development on natu-
ral sciences and engineering
7220 Research and experimental development on social sci-
ences and humanities
7410 Specialised design activities
7420 Photographic activities
7490 Other professional, scientific and technical activities
n.e.c.
7500 Veterinary activities
8510 Pre-primaryeducation
8520 Primary education
8531 General secondary educatio
8532 Technical and vocational secondary education
8541 Post-secondary non-tertiary education
8542 Tertiary education
8560 Educational support activities
8610 Hospital activities
8621 General medical practice activities
8622 Specialist medical practice activities
8623 Dental practice activities
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Table A.4: Industries classified as construction sector
NACE Code Industry
4110 Development of building projects
4120 Construction of residential and non-residential buildings
4211 Construction of roads and motorways
4212 Construction of railways and underground railways
4213 Construction of bridges and tunnels
4221 Construction of utility projects for fluids
4222 Construction of utility projects for electricity and telecommunications
4291 Construction of water projects
4299 Construction of other civil engineering projects n.e.c.
4311 Demolition
4312 Site preparation
4313 Test drilling and boring
4321 Electrical installation
4322 Plumbing, heat and air conditioning installation
4329 Other construction installation
4331 Plastering
4332 Joinery installation
4333 Floor and wall covering
4334 Painting and glazing
4339 Other building completion and finishing
4391 Roofing activities
4399 Other specialised construction activities n.e.c.
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Table A.5: Industries classified as service sector
NACE Code Industry
5610 Restaurants and mobile food service activities
5621 Event catering activities
5629 Other food service activities
5630 Beverage service activities
8299 Other business support activities
9700 Activities of households as domestic personnel
Table A.6: Firm Destruction
FraEast refers to the proportion of workers from EU8 plus Romania and Bulgaria by 2001. All regression
control for district and area*time fixed effects. The hazard rate is computed as the proportion of created
firms that are destroyed the following year.
Destruction/L HazardRate(1 year)
FrEast*Ann 0.02 0.001
(0.03) (0.001)
FrEast*Imp -0.08 0.001
(0.06) (0.001)
N 2233 2560
Adj R2 -0.02 0.03
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Table A.7: Reduced Form Regressions at the Travel to Work Area Level
FraEast refers to the proportion of workers from EU8 plus Romania and Bulgaria by 2001. At the
extensive margin (firm creation) the regression controls for travel to work area fixed effects and for
region*time fixed effects. At the intensive margin (fixed capital investment and wages) the regression
controls for company fixed effects and region*time dummies.
Panel A: Regressions Announcement and Implementation
Ln(Firms) Ln(FixedAssets) Ln(AverageWage)
FrEast*Ann 1.98 0.56*** 0.11
(1.23) (0.21) (0.16)
FrEast*Imp 1.7 0.01 0.18
(1.33) (0.22) (0.15)
N 3360 351898 205129
Adj R2 0.93 0.93 0.97
Panel B: Reduced Form Announcement
Ln(Firms) Ln(FixedAssets) Ln(AverageWage)
FrEast*Ann 5.55** 0.45** 0.1
(2.4) (0.2) (0.001)
N 2130 263638 2560
Adj R2 0.94 0.94 0.03
Frequency Quarterly Yearly Yearly
Aggregation Travel To Work Areas (TTWA)
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